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1
1 Introduction
In this paper we present an analysis of R&D investment in a dynamic oligopoly model
with differentiated goods by differential game approach. There are many studies of dy-
namic oligopoly by differential game theory, for example, Cellini and Lambertini (2003),
Cellini and Lambertini (2004), Cellini and Lambertini (2005), Cellini and Lambertini (2007),
Cellini and Lambertini (2011), Fujiwara (2006), Fujiwara (2008), and Lambertini (2018).
Among them Cellini and Lambertini (2011) analyzed the problem of R&D investment to cost-
reducing activities in a Cournot oligopoly and a Bertrand oligopoly with differentiated goods.
However, most of these studies including Cellini and Lambertini (2011) used a model of linear
demand functions and quadratic or linear cost functions. These assumptions are very lim-
ited. We study the problem addressed by them in an oligopoly with general demand and cost
functions.
In the next section we present a model and assumptions. In Section 3 we consider the
steady state level of R&D investment which is common to Bertrand and Cournot cases in the
open-loop solution, the memoryless closed-loop and the feedback solution. In Section 4 we
consider the open-loop solution of the R&D investment in a Bertrand oligopoly. In Section
5 we consider the open-loop solution of the R&D investment in a Cournot oligopoly, and
compare the results of two cases in Section 6. We show the following results.
1. The steady state value of the R&D investment by each firm is decreasing with respect to
the number of firms.
2. The steady state value of the industry R&D investment is increasing with respect to the
number of firms.
3. TheR&D investment of each firm given the cost level in the open-loop Bertrand oligopoly
is larger than that in the open-loop Cournot oligopoly.
Cellini and Lambertini (2011) (also Cellini and Lambertini (2005) for an oligopoly with
a homogeneous good) claim that the open-loop solution and the memoryless closed-loop
solution coincide. However, as Smrkolj and Wagener (2016) point out, this claim is incorrect1
We present brief discussion about the memoryless closed-loop case in Section 7. We show the
following results
1. Suppose that there is no spillover effect of R&D investment in a Bertrand oligopoly. If
the strategic variables (prices) of the firms are strategic substitutes (or strategic com-
plements), the R&D investment of each firm given the cost level in the memoryless
closed-loop case is larger (smaller) than that in the open-loop case.
2. Suppose that there is no spillover effect of R&D investment in a Cournot oligopoly.
If the strategic variables (outputs) of the firms are strategic substitutes (or strategic
complements), the R&D investment of each firm given the cost level in the memoryless
closed-loop case is larger (smaller) than that in the open-loop case.
1Strictly speaking, Smrkolj and Wagener (2016) is a comment on Cellini and Lambertini (2009). But
Cellini and Lambertini (2005) and Cellini and Lambertini (2009) use the same model, and the model of
Cellini and Lambertini (2011) is similar to it.
2
In Section 8we examine the feedback solutions using theHamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation,
and show that if there is no spillover effect of R&D investment, the memoryless closed-loop
solution and the feedback solution are equivalent both in the Bertrand oligopoly and the
Cournot oligopoly.
Strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity
We assume that the goods of the firms are substitutes, not complements. This means that a
rise in the price of one good increases the demands for other goods, and an increase in the
output of one good lowers the prices of other goods. However, the strategic variables (outputs
or prices) of the firms may be strategic substitutes or strategic complements.
In the Cournot oligopoly, if the reaction of a firm’s output to an increase in the output of
another firm is negative (or positive), the outputs of firms are strategic substitutes (or strategic
complements).
Note that if inverse demand (and direct) functions are linear, the outputs are strategic
substitutes.
On the other hand, in the Bertrand oligopoly, if the reaction of the price of a firm’s good
to a rise in the price of another firm’ good is negative (or positive), the prices of the goods of
firms are strategic substitutes (or strategic complements).
Note that if direct demand (and inverse demand) functions are linear, the prices are strategic
complements.
2 The model
Consider an oligopolywith n firms in which at any t ∈ [0,∞) they produce differentiated goods
to maximize their discounted profits. The goods are substitutes. The firms are called Firms 1,
2, . . . , n. Let qi(t) be the output of Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, pi(t) be the price of the good of
Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, at t. The utility of a representative consumer is
u(q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t)) + x(t).
x(t) is the consumption of a numeraire good. Let y(t) be his income. Then, the utility
maximization problem is
max
q1(t),q2(t),...,qn(t)
[u(q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t)) + x(t)]
subject to
n∑
i=1
pi(t)qi(t) + x(t) = y(t).
The conditions for utility maximization are
∂u(q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t))
∂qi(t)
= pi(t), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
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From them the inverse demand functions are obtained as follows.
pi(t) = pi(q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t)), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
We have
∂pi(q1(t),q2(t),...,qn(t))
∂qi(t)
< 0, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, and since the goods are substitutes
∂pi(q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t))
∂q j(t)
< 0.
If the outputs of the firms are strategic substitutes,
∂pi(q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t))
∂q j(t)
+
∂2pi(q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t))
∂qi(t)∂q j(t)
qi(t) < 0, j , i.
If they are strategic complements,
∂pi(q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t))
∂q j(t)
+
∂2pi(q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t))
∂qi(t)∂q j(t)
qi(t) > 0, j , i.
The production cost of Firm i is
C(mi(t), qi(t)), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
mi(t) is a parameter which represents the current cost of Firm i. Denote C(mi(t), qi(t)) by Ci .
It satisfies
∂Ci
∂qi(t)
> 0,
∂Ci
∂mi(t)
> 0,
∂2Ci
∂qi(t)∂mi(t)
> 0.
Inverting the inverse demand functions, the direct demand functions are obtained as follows.
qi(t) = q(p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pn(t)), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
We have
∂qi(p1(t),p2(t),...,pn(t))
∂pi(t)
< 0, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, and since the goods are substitutes
∂qi(p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pn(t))
∂p j(t)
> 0.
If the prices of the goods of the firms are strategic substitutes,
∂qi
∂p j(t)
+
(
pi(t) −
∂Ci
∂qi(t)
)
∂2qi
∂pi(t)∂p j(t)
< 0, j , i,
If they are strategic complements,
∂qi
∂p j(t)
+
(
pi(t) −
∂Ci
∂qi(t)
)
∂2qi
∂pi(t)∂p j(t)
> 0, j , i.
Let ki(t) be the R&D investment by Firm i. The moving of mi(t) is governed by
dmi(t)
dt
= mi(t)[−Γ(ki(t),K−i(t)) + δ], (1)
4
where
Γ(ki(t),K−i(t)) > 0, K−i =
∑
j,i
k j(t).
δ ∈ (0, 1) is a constant depreciation rate. Denote Γ(ki(t),K−i(t)) by Γi. We assume that Γi is
strictly increasing and concave, that is,
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
> 0,
∂Γi
∂K−i(t)
≥ 0,
and
∂2Γi
∂ki(t)2
≤ 0,
∂2Γi
∂K−i(t)2
≤ 0,
∂2Γi
∂ki(t)∂K−i(t)
≤ 0.
Also we assume ∂Γ(ki(t),K−i(t))∂ki(t)
 >
∂Γ(ki(t),K−i(t))∂K−i(t)
 .
This means that the direct effect of R&D investment is larger than the spillover effect.
The R&D cost of Firm i is
γ(ki(t)), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
We assume that it is strictly increasing and strictly convex, that is, γ′(ki(t)) > 0 and γ
′′(ki(t)) >
0.
3 The steady state R&D investment
Let k∗ be the steady state value of ki(t). At the steady state the following equation holds.
Γ(k∗, (n − 1)k∗) = −δ. (2)
From this we obtain
dk∗
dn
= −
∂Γ(k∗,(n−1)k∗)
∂K−i(t)
k∗
∂Γ(k∗,(n−1)k∗)
∂ki(t)
+ (n − 1)
∂Γ(k∗,(n−1)k∗)
∂K−i(t)
≤ 0. (3)
Also
dnk∗
dn
= k∗ + n
dk∗
dn
=
(
∂Γ(k∗,(n−1)k∗)
∂ki(t)
−
∂Γ(k∗,(n−1)k∗)
∂K−i(t)
)
k∗
∂Γ(k∗,(n−1)k∗)
∂ki(t)
+ (n − 1)
∂Γ(k∗,(n−1)k∗)
∂K−i(t)
> 0. (4)
They are because
∂Γ(k∗,(n−1)k∗)
∂ki(t)
> 0,
∂Γ(k∗,(n−1)k∗)
∂K−i(t)
≥ 0,
 ∂Γ(k∗,(n−1)k∗)∂ki (t)
 >  ∂Γ(k∗,(n−1)k∗)∂K−i(t)
.
These results mean that the steady state value of the R&D investment by each firm is
decreasing with respect to the number of firms, while the total R&D investment is increasing
with respect to the number of firms.
Summarizing the results in the following proposition.
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Proposition 1. 1. The steady state value of the R&D investment by each firm is decreasing
with respect to the number of firms.
2. The steady state value of the industry R&D investment is increasing with respect to the
number of firms.
Note that these conclusions hold in both the Bertrand oligopoly and the Cournot oligopoly
and in the open-loop case, the memoryless closed-loop case and the feedback case because (2)
holds in all cases.
4 R&D in a dynamic oligopoly: Bertrand competition
We seek to the solution of the open-loop approach in the Bertrand oligopoly. The instantaneous
profit of Firm i is written as
qi(p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pn(t))pi(t) − C(mi(t), qi(t)) − γ(ki(t)).
The objective of Firm i is
max
pi(t),ki (t)
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt[qi(p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pn(t))pi(t) − C(mi(t), qi(t)) − γ(ki(t))]dt,
subject to (1).
The present value Hamiltonian function for Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, is
Hi(pi(t), ki(t)) =e
−ρt
{
qi(p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pn(t))pi(t) − C(mi(t), qi(t)) − γ(ki(t))
+ λii(t)mi(t)[−Γ(ki(t),K−i(t)) + δ] +
∑
j,i
λi j(t)m j(t)[−Γ(k j (t),K− j (t)) + δ]
}
,
where
K− j (t) =
∑
l, j
kl(t).
This includes ki(t).
The current value Hamiltonian function for Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, is
Hˆi(pi(t), ki(t)) =e
ρtHi = qi(p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pn(t))pi(t) − C(mi(t), qi(t)) − γ(ki(t))
+ λii(t)mi(t)[−Γ(ki(t),K−i(t)) + δ] +
∑
j,i
λi j(t)m j(t)[−Γ(k j (t),K− j (t)) + δ].
Let
µi(t) = e
−ρtλi .
µi(t) is the costate variable. Denote Hˆi(pi(t), ki(t)) by Hˆi.
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The first order conditions for Firm i are
∂Hˆi
∂pi(t)
=qi(p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pn(t)) (5)
+
(
pi(t) −
∂C(mi(t), qi(t))
∂qi(t)
)
∂qi(p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pn(t)
∂pi(t)
= 0,
and
∂Hˆi
∂ki(t)
= −γ′(ki(t)) − λii(t)
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
mi(t) −
∑
j,i
λi j(t)
∂Γi
∂K−i(t)
m j(t) = 0. (6)
The second order condition for Firm i about the price choice is
∂Hˆ2
i
∂pi(t)2
=2
∂qi(p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pn(t)
∂pi(t)
+
(
pi(t) −
∂C(mi(t), qi(t))
∂qi(t)
)
∂2qi(p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pn(t)
∂pi(t)2
−
∂2C(mi(t), qi(t))
∂qi(t)2
(
∂qi(p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pn(t)
∂pi(t)
)2
< 0.
Its second order condition about the R&D investment choice is
∂2Hˆi
∂ki(t)2
= −γ′′(ki(t)) − λii(t)
∂2Γi
∂ki(t)2
mi(t) −
∑
j,i
λi j(t)
∂2Γj
∂K−i(t)2
m j(t) < 0. (7)
The adjoint conditions are
−
∂Hˆi
∂mi(t)
=
∂λii(t)
∂t
− ρλii(t), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, (8)
and
−
∂Hˆi
∂m j(t)
=
∂λi j(t)
∂t
− ρλi j(t), j , i. (9)
We have
∂Hˆi
∂mi(t)
= −
∂Ci
∂mi(t)
+ λii(t)[−Γ(ki(t),K−i(t)) + δ], (10)
∂Hˆi
∂m j(t)
= λi j(t)[−Γ(k j (t),K− j(t) + δ], (11)
At the steady state
dmi(t)
dt
= mi(t)[−Γ(ki(t),K−i(t)) + δ] = 0,
∂λii
∂t
= 0 and
∂λi j
∂t
= 0, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, j , i. By symmetry of the oligopoly we can assume
λii(t) = λ j j(t) for j , i, λi j(t) = λil(t) = λ ji(t) for j, l , i,
∂k j(t)
∂mi(t)
=
∂kl(t)
∂m j(t)
for l , j, mi(t) = m j(t)
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for j , i, and so on. Denote the steady state values of λii, λi j , pi(t), ki(t) and mi(t) by λown,
λother , p
∗
B
, k∗
B
and m∗
B
. Then, (10) and (11) are reduced to
∂Hˆi
∂mi(t)
= −
∂Ci
∂mi(t)
,
∂Hˆi
∂m j(t)
= 0,
and (8) and (9) are rewritten as
∂Ci
∂mi(t)
= −ρλown,
and
λother = 0.
Since
∂Ci
∂mi(t)
< 0, we have λown > 0. The first order condition for the choice of ki(t), (6), is
reduced to
−γ′(ki(t)) − λown
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
m∗B = 0.
This means
∂C(m∗
B
, q∗
B
)
∂mi(t)
∂Γ(k∗
B
, (n − 1)k∗
B
)
∂ki(t)
=
ρ
m∗
B
γ′(k∗B). (12)
Linear and quadratic example
According to Cellini and Lambertini (2011), assume that the direct demand functions are
qi(t) =
a
ϕ
−
(ϕ − s)pi(t)
(1 − s)ϕ
+
s
(1 − s)ϕ
∑
j,i
p j(t),
where ϕ = 1 + (n − 1)s. The production cost of Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, is
C(mi(t), qi(t)) = mi(t)qi(t),
the R&D cost of Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, is
γ(ki(t)) = b[ki(t)]
2, b > 0.
The moving of mi(t) is governed by
dmi(t)
dt
= mi(t)[−Γ(ki(t),K−i(t)) + δ] = mi(t)[−ki(t) − βK−i(t) + δ], β < 1.
(3) and (4) are reduced to
dk∗
B
dn
= −
βk∗
B
1 + (n − 1)β
< 0,
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and
dnk∗
B
dn
= k∗B + n
dk∗
B
dn
=
(1 − β)k∗
B
1 + (n − 1)β
> 0.
From (12)
q∗B =
2ρ
m∗
B
bk∗B.
Since
p∗B =
a(1 − s) + m∗
B
[1 + (n − 2)s]
2 + (n − 3)s
, q∗B =
(a − m∗
B
)[1 + (n − 2)s]
[2 + (n − 3)s][1 + (n − 1)s]
in this example, we have
k∗B

given m∗
B
=
m∗
B
(a − m∗
B
)[1 + (n − 2)s]
2bρ[2 + (n − 3)s][1 + (n − 1)s]
.
5 R&D in a dynamic oligopoly: Cournot competition
We seek to the solution of the open-loop approach in the Cournot oligopoly. The instantaneous
profit of Firm i is written as
pi(q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t))qi(t) − C(mi(t), qi(t)) − γ(ki(t)).
The objective of Firm i is
max
qi(t),ki (t)
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt[pi(q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t))qi(t) − C(mi(t), qi(t)) − γ(ki(t))]dt,
subject to (1).
The present value Hamiltonian function for Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} is
Hi(pi(t), ki(t)) =e
−ρt
{
pi(q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t))qi(t) − C(mi(t), qi(t)) − γ(ki(t))
+ λii(t)mi(t)[−Γ(ki(t),K−i(t)) + δ] +
∑
j,i
λi j(t)m j(t)[−Γ(k j (t),K− j (t)) + δ]
}
,
where
K− j (t) =
∑
l, j
kl(t).
The current value Hamiltonian function for Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} is
Hˆi(pi(t), ki(t)) =e
ρtHi = pi(q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t))qi(t) − C(mi(t), qi(t)) − γ(ki(t))
+ λii(t)mi(t)[−Γ(ki(t),K−i(t)) + δ] +
∑
j,i
λi j(t)m j(t)[−Γ(k j (t),K− j (t)) + δ].
Let
µi(t) = e
−ρtλi .
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µi(t) is the costate variable. Denote Hˆi(qi(t), ki(t)) by Hˆi.
The first order conditions for Firm i are
∂Hˆi
∂qi(t)
=pi(q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t)) +
∂pi(q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t))
∂qi(t)
qi(t) (13)
−
∂C(mi(t), qi(t))
∂qi(t)
= 0,
and
∂Hˆi
∂ki(t)
= −γ′(ki(t)) − λii(t)
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
mi(t) −
∑
j,i
λi j(t)
∂Γi
∂K−i(t)
m j(t) = 0.
The second order condition for Firm i about the output choice is
∂Hˆ2
i
∂qi(t)2
= 2
∂pi(q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t))
∂qi(t)
+
∂2pi(q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t))
∂qi(t)2
qi(t)−
∂2C(mi(t), qi(t))
2
∂qi(t)
< 0.
Its second order condition about the R&D investment choice is
∂2Hˆi
∂ki(t)2
= −γ′′(ki(t)) − λii(t)
∂2Γi
∂ki(t)2
mi(t) −
∑
j,i
λi j(t)
∂2Γj
∂K−i(t)2
m j(t) < 0. (14)
The adjoint conditions are the same those in the Bertrand oligopoly. Denote the steady state
values of λii, λi j , qi(t), ki(t) and mi(t) by λown, λother , q
∗
C
, k∗
C
and m∗
C
. Similarly to the Bertrand
oligopoly we obtain
∂C(m∗
C
, q∗
C
)
∂mi(t)
∂Γ(k∗
C
, (n − 1)k∗
C
)
∂ki(t)
=
ρ
m∗
C
γ′(k∗C). (15)
Linear and quadratic example
Assume that the inverse demand functions are
pi(t) = a − qi(t) −
n∑
j,i
sq j(t), 0 < s < 1.
They are derived from the direct demand functions in the previous example.
The production cost of Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} is
C(mi(t), qi(t)) = mi(t)qi(t),
the R&D investment cost of Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, is
γ(ki(t)) = b[ki(t)]
2, b > 0.
The moving of mi(t) is governed by
dmi(t)
dt
= mi(t)[−Γ(ki(t),K−i(t)) + δ] = mi(t)[−ki(t) − βK−i(t) + δ], β < 1.
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From (15)
q∗C =
2ρ
m∗
C
bk∗C .
Since q∗
C
=
a−m∗
C
2+(n−1)s
in this example,
k∗C

given m∗
C
=
m∗
C
(a − m∗
C
)
2bρ[2 + (n − 1)s]
.
6 Comparison of Bertrand and Cournot given the cost level
In the linear and quadratic example, as Cellini and Lambertini (2011) shows, we have
k∗B > k
∗
C .
We examine the general case. From (12) and (15) k∗
B
(or k∗
C
, the same hereinafter) given the
cost level m∗
B
= m∗
C
is obtained by the following equation.
−
ρ
m∗
B
γ′(k∗B) +
∂C(m∗
B
, q∗
B
)
∂mi(t)
∂Γ(k∗
B
, (n − 1)k∗
B
)
∂ki(t)
= 0. (16)
By the second order conditions about the R&D investment, (7) and (14), the left-hand side of
(16) is decreasing with respect to k∗
B
. On the other hand, since
∂2C(m∗
B
,q∗
B
)
∂qi(t)∂mi(t)
> 0,
∂C(m∗
B
,q∗
B
)
∂mi(t)
is
increasing with respect to q∗
B
. Therefore, the larger is q∗
B
, the larger is k∗
B
.
The first order condition for the price choice in the Bertrand oligopoly is
qi(p
∗
B, p
∗
B, . . . , p
∗
B) +
(
p∗B −
∂C(mi(t), qi(t))
∂qi(t)
)
∂qi(p
∗
B
, p∗
B
, . . . , p∗
B
)
∂pi(t)
= 0. (17)
The first order condition for the output choice in the Cournot oligopoly is
pi(q
∗
C, q
∗
C, . . . , q
∗
C) +
∂pi(q
∗
C
, q∗
C
, . . . , q∗
C
)
∂qi(t)
q∗C −
∂C(mi(t), qi(t))
∂qi(t)
= 0. (18)
Assume qi(t) = q
∗
B
and pi(t) = p
∗
B
for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. From (17)
q∗B = −
(
p∗B −
∂C(mi(t), qi(t))
∂qi(t)
)
∂qi(p
∗
B
, p∗
B
, . . . , p∗
B
)
∂pi(t)
.
Substituting this into the left-hand side of (18) (assuming q∗
C
= q∗
B
) yields(
p∗B −
∂C(mi(t), qi(t))
∂qi(t)
) (
1 −
∂qi(p
∗
B
, p∗
B
, . . . , p∗
B
)
∂pi(t)
∂pi(q
∗
B
, q∗
B
, . . . , q∗
B
)
∂qi(t)
)
. (19)
Since p∗
B
−
∂C(mi(t),qi(t))
∂qi(t)
> 0, and from (43) in Appendix 1
∂qi(p
∗
B
, p∗
B
, . . . , p∗
B
)
∂pi(t)
∂pi(q
∗
B
, q∗
B
, . . . , q∗
B
)
∂qi(t)
> 1, (20)
(19) is negative, and then the output of each firm in the Bertrand oligopoly is larger than that
in the Cournot oligopoly. Thus, we obtain the following proposition.
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Proposition 2. The R&D investment of each firm given the cost level in the open-loop Bertrand
oligopoly is larger than that in the open-loop Cournot oligopoly.
7 Memoryless closed-loop solution without spillover
7.1 Bertrand oligopoly
We seek to the solution of the memoryless closed-loop approach in the Bertrand oligopoly.
For simplicity, we assume
∂Γi
∂K−i(t)
= 0,
that is, there is no spillover effect of R&D investment. The first order conditions for Firm i are
∂Hˆi
∂pi(t)
=qi(p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pn(t)) (21)
+
(
pi(t) −
∂C(mi(t), qi(t))
∂qi(t)
)
∂qi(p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pn(t)
∂pi(t)
= 0,
and
∂Hˆi
∂ki(t)
= −γ′(ki(t)) − λii(t)
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
mi(t) = 0. (22)
The adjoint conditions are
−
∂Hˆi
∂mi(t)
−
∑
j,i
∂Hˆi
∂k j(t)
∂k j(t)
∂mi(t)
−
∑
j,i
∂Hˆi
∂p j(t)
∂p j(t)
∂mi(t)
(23)
=
∂λii(t)
∂t
− ρλii(t), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
and
−
∂Hˆi
∂m j(t)
−
∑
l,i, j
∂Hˆi
∂kl(t)
∂kl(t)
∂m j(t)
−
∂Hˆi
∂k j(t)
∂k j(t)
∂m j(t)
−
∑
l,i, j
∂Hˆi
∂pl(t)
∂pl(t)
∂m j(t)
−
∂Hˆi
∂p j(t)
∂p j(t)
∂m j(t)
=
∂λi j(t)
∂t
− ρλi j(t), j , i.
We have
∂Hˆi
∂mi(t)
= −
∂Ci
∂mi(t)
+ λii(t)[−Γ(ki(t),K−i(t)) + δ], (24)
∂Hˆi
∂m j(t)
= λi j(t)[−Γ(k j(t),K− j (t)) + δ], (25)
∂Hˆi
∂k j(t)
= −λi j(t)
∂Γj
∂k j(t)
m j(t),
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∂k j(t)
∂mi(t)
= 0,
∂k j(t)
∂m j(t)
= −
λ j j(t)
γ′′(ki(t)) + λ j j(t)
∂2Γj
∂ki(t2)
m j(t)
∂Γj
∂k j(t)
,
and
∂Hˆi
∂p j(t)
=
∂qi
∂p j(t)
pi(t)
∂p j(t)
∂mi(t)
is obtained by (44) in Appendix 2. If the prices of goods of the firms are strategic
substitutes
(
∂qj
∂pi(t)
+
(
p j(t) −
∂C(m j(t),qj (t))
∂qj(t)
)
∂2qj
∂pi(t)∂p j (t)
< 0
)
,
∂p j(t)
∂mi(t)
< 0, and if they are strategic
complements
(
∂qj
∂qi(t)
+
(
p j(t) −
∂C(m j(t),qj (t))
∂qj(t)
)
∂2qj
∂pi(t)∂p j (t)
> 0
)
,
∂p j(t)
∂mi(t)
> 0.
At the steady state we have
dmi(t)
dt
= mi(t)[−Γ(ki(t),K−i(t)) + δ] = 0,
∂λii
∂t
= 0 and
∂λi j
∂t
= 0, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, j , i. Then, (24) and (25) are reduced to
∂Hˆi
∂mi(t)
= −
∂Ci
∂mi(t)
,
∂Hˆi
∂m j(t)
= 0.
By symmetry of the oligopoly we can assume λii(t) = λ j j(t) for j , i, λi j(t) = λil(t) = λ ji(t)
for j, l , i,
∂k j(t)
∂mi(t)
=
∂kl(t)
∂m j(t)
for l , j, mi(t) = m j(t) for j , i, p j(t) = pi(t), and so on. Denote
the steady state values of λii, λi j , pi(t) and ki(t) by λown, λother , p
∗∗
B
and k∗∗
B
. Then, (23) is
rewritten as
∂Ci
∂mi(t)
− (n − 1)
∂qi
∂p j(t)
p∗∗B
∂p j(t)
∂mi(t)
= −ρλown.
The first order condition for the choice of ki(t), (22), is reduced to
−γ′(k∗∗B ) − λown
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
mi(t) = 0.
This means [
∂C(mi(t), qi(t))
∂mi(t)
− (n − 1)
∂qi
∂p j(t)
p∗∗B
∂p j(t)
∂mi(t)
]
∂Γ(k∗∗
B
, (n − 1)k∗∗
B
)
∂ki(t)
(26)
=
ρ
mi(t)
γ′(k∗∗B ).
The first order condition for the price choice in the memoryless closed-loop case, (21), is the
same as that, (5), in the open-loop case. Thus, we have q∗∗
B
= q∗
B
given the value of mi(t).
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Since
∂qi
∂p j(t)
> 0, γ′′(ki(t)) > 0,
∂C(mi(t),qi(t))
∂mi(t)
> 0 and
∂Γ(k∗∗
B
,(n−1)k∗∗
B
)
∂ki(t)
> 0, if the prices of goods
of the firms are strategic substitutes (
∂p j(t)
∂mi(t)
< 0), we have k∗∗
B
> k∗
B
; and if the prices of goods
of the firms are strategic complements (
∂p j(t)
∂mi(t)
> 0), we have k∗∗
B
< k∗
B
.
Note that in the case of linear demand functions the prices of the goods of the firms are
strategic complements, and so the R&D investment of each firm given the cost level in the
memoryless closed-loop case is smaller than that in the open-loop case.
7.2 Cournot oligopoly
We seek to the solution of the memoryless closed-loop approach in the Cournot oligopoly.
Similarly to the previous case, for simplicity, we assume
∂Γi
∂K−i(t)
= 0.
The first order conditions for Firm i are
∂Hˆi
∂qi(t)
=pi(q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t)) +
∂pi(q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t))
∂qi(t)
qi(t) (27)
−
∂C(mi(t), qi(t))
∂qi(t)
= 0,
and
∂Hˆi
∂ki(t)
= −γ′(ki(t)) − λii(t)
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
mi(t) = 0. (28)
The adjoint conditions are
−
∂Hˆi
∂mi(t)
−
∑
j,i
∂Hˆi
∂k j(t)
∂k j(t)
∂mi(t)
−
∑
j,i
∂Hˆi
∂q j(t)
∂q j(t)
∂mi(t)
(29)
=
∂λii(t)
∂t
− ρλii(t), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
and
−
∂Hˆi
∂m j(t)
−
∑
l,i, j
∂Hˆi
∂kl(t)
∂kl(t)
∂m j(t)
−
∂Hˆi
∂k j(t)
∂k j(t)
∂m j(t)
−
∑
l,i, j
∂Hˆi
∂ql(t)
∂ql(t)
∂m j(t)
−
∂Hˆi
∂q j(t)
∂q j(t)
∂m j(t)
=
∂λi j(t)
∂t
− ρλi j(t), j , i.
We have
∂Hˆi
∂mi(t)
= −
∂Ci
∂mi(t)
+ λii(t)[−Γ(ki(t),K−i(t)) + δ], (30)
∂Hˆi
∂m j(t)
= λi j(t)[−Γ(k j(t),K− j (t)) + δ], (31)
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∂Hˆi
∂k j(t)
= −λi j(t)
∂Γj
∂k j(t)
m j(t),
∂k j(t)
∂mi(t)
= 0,
∂k j(t)
∂m j(t)
= −
λ j j(t)
γ′′(k j(t)) + λ j j(t)
∂2Γj
∂k j(t)2
mi(t)
∂Γj
∂k j(t)
,
and
∂Hˆi
∂q j(t)
=
∂pi
∂q j(t)
qi(t).
∂qj(t)
∂mi(t)
is obtained by (45) in Appendix 3. If the outputs of the firms are strategic substitutes(
∂p j
∂qi(t)
+
∂2p j
∂qi(t)∂qj (t)
q j(t) < 0
)
,
∂qj(t)
∂mi(t)
> 0, and if they are strategic complements
(
∂p j
∂qi(t)
+
∂2p j
∂qi(t)∂qj (t)
q j(t) < 0
)
,
∂qj(t)
∂mi(t)
< 0.
At the steady state we have
dmi(t)
dt
= mi(t)[−Γ(ki(t),K−i(t)) + δ] = 0,
∂λii
∂t
= 0 and
∂λi j
∂t
= 0, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, j , i. Then, (30) and (31) are reduced to
∂Hˆi
∂mi(t)
= −
∂Ci
∂mi(t)
,
∂Hˆi
∂m j(t)
= 0.
By symmetry of the oligopoly we can assume λii(t) = λ j j(t) for j , i, λi j(t) = λil(t) = λ ji(t)
for j, l , i,
∂k j (t)
∂mi(t)
=
∂kl(t)
∂m j(t)
for l , j, mi(t) = m j(t) for j , i, q j(t) = qi(t), and so on. Denote
the steady state values of λii, λi j , qi(t) and ki(t) by λown, λother , q
∗∗
C
and k∗∗
C
. Then, (29) is
rewritten as
∂Ci
∂mi(t)
− (n − 1)
∂pi
∂q j(t)
q∗∗C
∂q j(t)
∂mi(t)
= −ρλown.
The first order condition for the choice of ki(t), (28), is reduced to
−γ′(k∗∗C ) − λown
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
mi(t) = 0.
This means [
∂C(mi(t), qi(t))
∂mi(t)
− (n − 1)
∂pi
∂q j(t)
q∗∗C
∂q j(t)
∂mi(t)
]
∂Γ(k∗∗
C
, (n − 1)k∗∗
C
)
∂ki(t)
(32)
=
ρ
mi(t)
γ′(k∗∗C ).
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The first order condition for the output choice in the memoryless closed-loop case, (27), is the
same as that, (13), in the open-loop case. Thus, we have q∗∗
C
= q∗
C
given the value of mi(t).
Since
∂pi
∂qj(t)
< 0, γ′′(ki(t)) > 0,
∂C(mi(t),qi(t))
∂mi(t)
> 0 and
∂Γ(k∗∗
C
,(n−1)k∗∗
C
)
∂ki(t)
> 0, if the outputs of the
firms are strategic substitutes (
∂qj(t)
∂mi(t)
> 0), we have k∗∗
C
> k∗
C
; and if the outputs of the firms
are strategic complements (
∂qj(t)
∂mi(t)
< 0), we have k∗∗
C
< k∗
C
.
Note that in the case of linear inverse demand functions the outputs of the firms are strategic
substitutes, and so the R&D investment of each firm given the cost level in the memoryless
closed-loop case is larger than that in the open-loop case.
Summarizing the results in this section.
Proposition 3. 1. Suppose that there is no spillover effect of R&D investment in the
Bertrand oligopoly. If the prices of goods of the firms are strategic substitutes (or
strategic complements), the R&D investment of each firm given the cost level in the
memoryless closed-loop case is larger (or smaller) than that in the open-loop case.
2. Suppose that there is no spillover effect of R&D investment in the Cournot oligopoly. If
the outputs of the firms are strategic substitutes (or strategic complements), the R&D
investment of each firm given the cost level in the memoryless closed-loop case is larger
(smaller) than that in the open-loop case.
3. If the demand functions are linear in the Bertrand oligopoly, the R&D investment of
each firm given the cost level in the memoryless closed-loop case is smaller than that in
the open-loop case.
4. If the inverse demand functions are linear in the Cournot oligopoly, the R&D investment
of each firm given the cost level in the memoryless closed-loop case is larger than that
in the open-loop case.
8 Feedback solution without spillover
8.1 Bertrand oligopoly
We consider a solution of feedback approach in the Bertrand oligopoly using the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. Similarly to the memoryless closed-loop case, we assume
∂Γi
∂K−i(t)
= 0,
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that is, there is no spillover effect of the R&D investments. Let Vi(m1(t),m2(t), . . . ,mn(t)) be
the value function of Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. The HJB equation for Firm i is written as
ρVi(m1(t),m2(t), . . . ,mn(t)) (33)
= max
pi(t),ki (t)
{q(p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pn(t))pi(t) − C(mi(t), qi(t)) − γi(ki(t))
+
∂Vi(m1(t),m2(t), . . . ,mn(t)
∂mi(t)
mi(t)(−Γi + δ)
+
∑
j,i
∂Vi(m1(t),m2(t), . . . ,mn(t)
∂m j(t)
m j(t)(−Γj + δ)}.
The first order conditions are
∂Hˆi
∂pi(t)
=qi(p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pn(t)) (34)
+
(
pi(t) −
∂C(mi(t), qi(t))
∂qi(t)
)
∂qi(p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pn(t)
∂pi(t)
= 0,
and
− γ′(ki(t)) −
∂Vi(m1(t),m2(t), . . . ,mn(t))
∂mi(t)
mi(t)
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
= 0. (35)
From this
∂Vi(m1(t),m2(t), . . . ,mn(t))
∂mi(t)
mi(t) = −
γ′(ki(t))
∂Γi
∂ki (t)
.
Substituting this into (33), using symmetry, yields
ρVi(m1(t),m2(t), . . . ,mn(t)) = qi(p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pn(t))pi(t) − C(mi(t), qi(t)) − γi(ki(t))
−
γ′(ki(t))
∂Γi
∂ki (t)
(−Γi + δ) + (n − 1)
∂Vi(m1(t),m2(t), . . . ,mn(t)
∂m j(t)
m j(t)(−Γj + δ), j , i.
This is an identity. Differentiating it with respect to mi(t) yields
ρ
∂Vi(m1(t),m2(t), . . . ,mn(t))
∂mi(t)
= −
∂C(mi(t), qi(t))
∂mi(t)
+
[
qi(p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pn(t)) +
(
pi(t) −
∂C(mi(t), qi(t))
∂qi(t)
)
∂qi(p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pn(t)
∂pi(t)
]
∂pi(t)
∂mi(t)
+ (n − 1)
∂q j
∂pi(t)
pi(t)
∂p j(t)
∂mi(t)
−
∂
∂ki(t)
(
γ′(ki(t))
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
)
∂ki(t)
∂mi(t)
(−Γi + δ)
+ (n − 1)
∂2Vi(m1(t),m2(t), . . . ,mn(t)
∂mi(t)∂m j(t)
m j(t)(−Γj + δ).
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At the steady state −Γi + δ = −Γj + δ = 0. Thus, using (34), we get
ρ
∂Vi(m1(t),m2(t), . . . ,mn(t))
∂mi(t)
= −
∂C(mi(t), qi(t))
∂mi(t)
(36)
+ (n − 1)
∂q j
∂pi(t)
pi(t)
∂p j(t)
∂mi(t)
.
From (35) and (36), we obtain
−
ρ
mi(t)
γ′(ki(t)) +
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
[
∂C(mi(t), qi(t))
∂mi(t)
− (n − 1)
∂q j
∂pi(t)
pi(t)
∂p j(t)
∂mi(t)
]
= 0.
This is the same as (26) in the memoryless closed-loop case. Therefore, we get the following
proposition.
Proposition 4. If there is no spillover effect of R&D investment, the memoryless closed-loop
solution and the feedback solution in the Bertrand oligopoly are equivalent.
8.2 Cournot oligopoly
We consider a solution of feedback approach in the Cournot oligopoly using the HJB equation.
Similarly to the previous section we assume
∂Γi
∂K−i(t)
= 0.
Let Vi(m1(t),m2(t), . . . ,mn(t)) be the value function of Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. The HJB
equation for Firm i is written as
ρVi(m1(t),m2(t), . . . ,mn(t)) (37)
= max
qi(t),ki (t)
{pi(q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t))qi(t) − C(mi(t), qi(t)) − γi(ki(t))
+
∂Vi(m1(t),m2(t), . . . ,mn(t)
∂mi(t)
mi(t)(−Γi + δ)
+
∑
j,i
∂Vi(m1(t),m2(t), . . . ,mn(t)
∂m j(t)
m j(t)(−Γj + δ)}.
The first order conditions are
pi(q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t)) +
∂pi(q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t))
∂qi(t)
qi(t) (38)
−
∂C(mi(t), qi(t))
∂qi(t)
= 0,
and
− γ′(ki(t)) −
∂Vi(m1(t),m2(t), . . . ,mn(t))
∂mi(t)
mi(t)
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
= 0. (39)
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From this
∂Vi(m1(t),m2(t), . . . ,mn(t))
∂mi(t)
mi(t) = −
γ′(ki(t))
∂Γi
∂ki (t)
.
Substituting this into (37), using symmetry, yields
ρVi(m1(t),m2(t), . . . ,mn(t)) = pi(q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t))qi(t) − C(mi(t), qi(t)) − γi(ki(t))
−
γ′(ki(t))
∂Γi
∂ki (t)
(−Γi + δ) + (n − 1)
∂Vi(m1(t),m2(t), . . . ,mn(t)
∂m j(t)
m j(t)(−Γj + δ), j , i.
This is an identity. Differentiating it with respect to mi(t) yields
ρ
∂Vi(m1(t),m2(t), . . . ,mn(t))
∂mi(t)
= −
∂C(mi(t), qi(t))
∂mi(t)
+
[
pi(q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t)) +
∂pi(q1(t), q2(t), . . . , qn(t))
∂qi(t)
qi(t) −
∂C(mi(t), qi(t))
∂qi(t)
]
∂qi(t)
∂mi(t)
+ (n − 1)
∂pi
∂q j(t)
qi(t)
∂q j(t)
∂mi(t)
−
∂
∂ki(t)
(
γ′(ki(t))
∂Γi
∂ki (t)
)
∂ki(t)
∂mi(t)
(−Γi + δ)
+ (n − 1)
∂2Vi(m1(t),m2(t), . . . ,mn(t)
∂mi(t)∂m j(t)
m j(t)(−Γj + δ).
At the steady state −Γi + δ = −Γj + δ = 0. Thus, using (38), we get
ρ
∂Vi(m1(t),m2(t), . . . ,mn(t))
∂mi(t)
= −
∂C(mi(t), qi(t))
∂mi(t)
(40)
+ (n − 1)
∂pi
∂q j(t)
qi(t)
∂q j(t)
∂mi(t)
.
From (39) and (40), we obtain
−
ρ
mi(t)
γ′(ki(t)) +
∂Γi
∂ki(t)
[
∂C(mi(t), qi(t))
∂mi(t)
− (n − 1)
∂pi
∂q j(t)
qi(t)
∂q j(t)
∂mi(t)
]
= 0.
This is the same as (32) in the memoryless closed-loop case. Therefore, we get the following
proposition.
Proposition 5. If there is no spillover effect of R&D investment, the memoryless closed-loop
solution and the feedback solution in the Cournot oligopoly are equivalent.
9 Concluding Remark
In this paper we analyzed the memoryless closed-loop solution and the feedback solution
only when there is no spillover effect of R&D investment. In the future research we want
to investigate the relations among the open-loop solution, the closed-loop solution and the
feedback solution in a case with spillovers.
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Appendix 1: Derivation of (20)
The direct and the inverse demand functions are as follows.
qi = qi(p1, p2, . . . , pn), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
pi = pi(q1, q2, . . . , qn), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. (41)
20
We omit t. Differentiating (41) with respect to pi given p j, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, j , i, yields
∂pi
∂qi
∂qi
∂pi
+
n∑
j=1, j,i
∂pi
∂q j
∂q j
∂pi
= 1,
and
∂p j
∂qi
∂qi
∂pi
+
∂p j
∂q j
∂q j
∂pi
+
n∑
k=1,k,i, j
∂p j
∂qk
∂qk
∂pi
= 0, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, j , i.
Since by symmetry
∂pi
∂qj
=
∂p j
∂qi
=
∂p j
∂qk
,
∂p j
∂qj
=
∂pi
∂qi
and
∂qk
∂pi
=
∂qj
∂pi
at the steady state, they are
rewritten as
∂pi
∂qi
∂qi
∂pi
+ (n − 1)
∂p j
∂qi
∂q j
∂pi
= 1,
and
∂p j
∂qi
∂qi
∂pi
+
[
∂pi
∂qi
+ (n − 2)
∂p j
∂qi
]
∂q j
∂pi
= 0.
From them we get
∂qi
∂pi
=
∂q j
∂p j
=
∂pi
∂qi
+ (n − 2)
∂p j
∂qi(
∂pi
∂qi
−
∂p j
∂qi
) [
∂pi
∂qi
+ (n − 1)
∂p j
∂qi
] , (42)
and
∂q j
∂pi
=
∂qi
∂p j
= −
∂p j
∂qi(
∂pi
∂qi
−
∂p j
∂qi
) [
∂pi
∂qi
+ (n − 1)
∂p j
∂qi
] ,
because
∂qi
∂p j
=
∂qj
∂pi
and
∂qi
∂pi
=
∂qj
∂p j
at the steady state.
From (42)
1 −
∂qi
∂pi
∂pi
∂qi
=
(
∂pi
∂qi
−
∂p j
∂qi
) [
∂pi
∂qi
+ (n − 1)
∂p j
∂qi
]
−
(
∂pi
∂qi
)2
− (n − 2)
∂pi
∂qi
∂p j
∂qi(
∂pi
∂qi
−
∂p j
∂qi
) [
∂pi
∂qi
+ (n − 1)
∂p j
∂qi
] (43)
=
−(n − 1)
(
∂p j
∂qi
)2
(
∂pi
∂qi
−
∂p j
∂qi
) [
∂pi
∂qi
+ (n − 1)
∂p j
∂qi
] < 0.
Appendix 2: Derivation of
∂p j(t)
∂mi(t)
.
Suppose a state such that p1(t) = p2(t) = · · · = pn(t). The first order conditions for Firm i and
Firm j, j , i, are
qi(p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pn(t)) +
(
pi(t) −
∂Ci
∂qi(t)
)
∂qi(p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pn(t)
∂pi(t)
= 0,
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and
q j(p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pn(t)) +
(
p j(t) −
∂Cj
∂q j(t)
)
∂q j(p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pn(t)
∂p j(t)
= 0,
Denote qi(p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pn(t)) by qi. Differentiating them with respect to mi(t) yields
ϕi
∂pi(t)
∂mi(t)
+ ψi
∂p j(t)
∂mi(t)
=
∂2Ci
∂qi(t)∂mi(t)
∂qi
∂pi(t)
,
and
ψ j
∂pi(t)
∂mi(t)
+ ϕ j
∂p j(t)
∂mi(t)
= 0,
where
ϕi = 2
∂qi
∂pi(t)
+
(
pi(t) −
∂Ci
∂qi(t)
)
∂2qi
∂pi(t)2
−
∂2Ci
∂qi(t)2
(
∂qi
∂pi(t)
)2
,
ψi = (n − 1)
[
∂qi
∂p j(t)
+
(
pi(t) −
∂Ci
∂qi(t)
)
∂2qi
∂pi(t)∂p j(t)
]
,
ψ j =
∂q j
∂pi(t)
+
(
p j(t) −
∂Cj
∂q j(t)
)
∂2q j
∂pi(t)∂p j(t)
,
ϕ j =2
∂q j
∂p j(t)
+
(
p j(t) −
∂Cj
∂q j(t)
)
∂2q j
∂p j(t)2
+ (n − 2)
[
∂q j
∂pl(t)
+
(
p j(t) −
∂Cj
∂q j(t)
)
∂2q j
∂p j(t)∂pl(t)
]
−
∂2Cj
∂q j(t)2
(
∂q j
∂p j(t)
)2
, l , j .
From them we obtain
∂pi(t)
∂mi(t)
=
ϕ j
ϕiϕ j − ψiψ j
∂2Ci
∂qi(t)∂mi(t)
∂qi(t)
∂pi(t)
< 0,
and
∂p j(t)
∂mi(t)
= −
ψ j
ϕiϕ j − ψiψ j
∂2Ci
∂qi(t)∂mi(t)
∂qi(t)
∂pi(t)
. (44)
We have ϕi < 0, ϕ j < 0 and ϕiϕ j − ψiψ j > 0. If the prices of goods of the firms are strategic
substitutes
(
ψ j < 0
)
,
∂p j(t)
∂mi(t)
< 0, and if they are strategic complements
(
ψ j > 0
)
,
∂p j(t)
∂mi(t)
> 0.
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Appendix 3: Derivation of
∂q j(t)
∂mi(t)
.
Suppose a state such that q1(t) = q2(t) = · · · = qn(t). The first order conditions for Firm i and
Firm j, j , i are
pi(q1(t), q1(t), . . . , qn(t)) +
∂pi(q1(t), q1(t), . . . , qn(t))
∂qi(t)
qi(t) −
∂Ci
∂qi(t)
= 0,
and
p j(q1(t), q1(t), . . . , qn(t)) +
∂p j(q1(t), q1(t), . . . , qn(t))
∂q j(t)
q j(t) −
∂Cj
∂q j(t)
= 0,
Denote pi(q1(t), q1(t), . . . , qn(t)) by pi. Differentiating them with respect to mi(t) yields[
2
∂pi
∂qi(t)
+
∂2pi
∂qi(t)2
qi(t) −
∂2Ci
∂qi(t)2
]
∂qi(t)
∂mi(t)
+ (n − 1)
[
∂pi
∂q j(t)
+
∂2pi
∂qi(t)∂q j(t)
qi(t)
]
∂q j(t)
∂mi(t)
=
∂2Ci
∂qi(t)∂mi(t)
,
and[
∂p j
∂qi(t)
+
∂2p j
∂qi(t)∂q j(t)
q j(t)
]
∂qi(t)
∂mi(t)
+
[
n
∂p j
∂q j(t)
+ (n − 1)
∂2p j
∂q j(t)2
q j(t) −
∂2Cj
∂q j(t)2
]
∂q j(t)
∂mi(t)
= 0.
From them we obtain
∂qi(t)
∂mi(t)
=
n
∂p j
∂qj(t)
+ (n − 1)
∂2p j
∂qj(t)2
q j(t) −
∂2Cj
∂qj(t)2
∆
∂2Ci
∂qi(t)∂mi(t)
< 0,
and
∂q j(t)
∂mi(t)
= −
∂p j
∂qi(t)
+
∂2p j
∂qi(t)∂qj (t)
q j(t)
∆
∂2Ci
∂qi(t)∂mi(t)
, (45)
where
∆ =
[
2
∂pi
∂qi(t)
+
∂2pi
∂qi(t)2
qi(t) −
∂2Ci
∂qi(t)2
] [
n
∂p j
∂q j(t)
+ (n − 1)
∂2p j
∂q j(t)2
q j(t) −
∂2Cj
∂q j(t)2
]
− (n − 1)
[
∂pi
∂q j(t)
+
∂2pi
∂qi(t)∂q j(t)
qi(t)
] [
∂p j
∂qi(t)
+
∂2p j
∂qi(t)∂q j(t)
q j(t)
]
> 0.
If the outputs of the firms are strategic substitutes
(
∂p j
∂qi(t)
+
∂2p j
∂qi(t)∂qj (t)
q j(t) < 0
)
,
∂qj(t)
∂mi(t)
> 0, and
if they are strategic complements
(
∂p j
∂qi(t)
+
∂2p j
∂qi(t)∂qj (t)
q j(t) > 0
)
,
∂qj(t)
∂mi(t)
< 0.
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